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ABSTRACT

The United States Marine Corps contracted Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. (BHTI)
to develop and field new versions of the aging UH-1N and AH-1W helicopters. As part
of the development effort of the H-1 Upgrades, BHTI was tasked with development of a
folding rotor system and the associated equipment necessary to support main rotor
folding operations. The blade fold equipment (BFE) was constrained throughout the
development process by a list of conflicting requirements.

The requirements for

commonality, versatility, simplicity, light weight, rapid application, and durability, while
each was generally reasonable, could not be satisfied with one set of equipment. The
resulting BFE was ineffective for everyday use.
The purpose of this thesis was to evaluate the design requirements of the BFE,
specifically the blade fold racks. An investigation of the source of requirements was
conducted, followed by interviews with system experts and end users. Additional data
were gathered during the program-sponsored test events from January through May 2005.
In order to develop a suitable and effective set of BFE, the H-1 Upgrades program
should reduce the set of design requirements on the new blade fold racks, specifically:
1. Modify the H-1 Upgrades aircraft to incorporate an automatic folding rotor
system or a blade indexing motor.
2. Redesign the blade fold racks for a reduced set of configurations and load
conditions.
3. Consider a simple, one piece, clamping blade fold rack.
ii

PREFACE

The majority of the information contained within this thesis was obtained during a
support of the H-1 Upgrades Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development flight test
phase at Patuxent River, Maryland. The author’s participation in these flight and ground
test events prompted this topic as one for possible further investigation. The research,
results and discussion, and conclusions and recommendations presented are solely the
opinion of the author and should not be construed as an official position of the United
States Department of Defense, The United States Marine Corps, The United States Navy,
the Naval Air Systems Command, the Bell Helicopter Textron Corporation, or the
University of Tennessee.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

OBJECTIVE
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) contracted Bell Helicopter Textron
Incorporated (BHTI) to develop and field an upgrade to the existing UH-1N Huey and
AH-1W Cobra helicopters. The program, called “H-1 Upgrades”, was responsible for
engineering, manufacturing, and development (EMD) of the UH-1Y “Iroquios” and AH1Z “Super Cobra” helicopters. The new helicopters featured many upgrades to the
existing design, including replacement of the old two-blade main rotor system with a
more advanced four-blade design. In order to minimize the aircraft footprint main rotor
folding was required, which as a minimum had to fold two opposing blades of the fourbladed rotor.

As such, the H-1 Upgrades program and BHTI were tasked with

developing the support equipment (SE) and procedures for folding the new rotor design.
One of the critical items of SE developed under the H-1 Upgrades program was
the helicopter blade fold rack (BFR). The BFRs were required to solve a complex
problem, which was to facilitate a simple, effective blade folding process. The purpose
of this thesis was to evaluate the design requirements of the H-1 Upgrades helicopter
blade fold racks.
BACKGROUND
The majority of the evaluation and data collection cited herein took place between
2003 and 2005 at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland (NAS Pax River). In
2006, the H-1 Upgrades program proceeded to Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL), which
1

has not yet been completed. Upon completion of OPEVAL, a formal report of all areas
of suitability and effectiveness will be released from the operational testers to the Naval
acquisition community. The OPEVAL report should provide final resolution as to the
effectiveness and suitability of the blade fold system as a long-term solution for use by
the fleet.
The blade fold racks went through several design iterations, described later. At
the time of this report, “BFR 4 and BFR 5” were the current, most recent BFRs, and were
being evaluated in OPEVAL. BFR 4 and BFR 5 are referred to as the “current” or “most
recent” designs throughout this report.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
As part of the H-1 Upgrades development effort, BHTI was tasked to develop the
support equipment necessary for folding the main rotor blades. The blade fold support
equipment was required to meet a host of conflicting requirements: for example, the racks
had to be strong enough to withstand the force of a 100 kt wind on the main rotor blades
but light enough for one man to lift and install. The equipment had to be simple in design
and easy to use, but had to support three separate configurations, had to be common to
two different aircraft, and had to have multiple moving parts to accommodate the aircraft
design.

These conflicting requirements presented designers with an insurmountable

problem; there was no practical solution that could meet all the design requirements,
which is shown later in this paper.
Another problem with the program approach to the BFR design was that no
dedicated testing or evaluation of the racks was performed. No test plan was written, and
2

no report was prepared. This SE will have a major impact on the operational efficiency
of the final, fielded aircraft, and should have earned a dedicated evaluation period, early
in the flight test program. This thesis will evaluate the design requirements of the BFRs
and recommend changes to that set of requirements that would result in a more successful
BFR design.
DESCRIPTION OF THE H-1 UPGRADES AIRCRAFT
AH-1Z SUPER COBRA
The AH-1Z Super Cobra was a tandem two-seat attack helicopter with a 4-bladed
single main rotor and an anti-torque tail rotor, powered by two T700-GE-401 turbo-shaft
engines. The AH-1Z was an upgrade from the AH-1W, which included the following
modifications: a bearingless rigid main rotor head with composite rotor blades and a
blade-fold system; a new main transmission and a new auxiliary power unit; a new tail
rotor system, a new target sight system, and larger wings for increased weapons carriage.
In addition, the AH-1Z was equipped with a new integrated cockpit that included
upgrades to the communication, navigation, and electronic warfare systems as well as an
integrated helmet mounted display system. The AH-1Z was also equipped with a fouraxis stabilization and control augmentation system. The overall aircraft length with
rotors turning was approximately 58 feet, the height to the top of the main rotor hub was
13 feet 2 inches, and the skid width was approximately 7 ft. The maximum design gross
weight of the aircraft was 18,500 pounds with specification mission gross weights
ranging from 17,065 to 17,867 pounds. A complete description of the AH-1Z test aircraft
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is contained in references 1 and 2. One of the test aircraft, Bu No. 166479, is pictured in
Figure 1.
UH-1Y IROQUOIS
The UH-1Y Iroquois was a dual piloted utility helicopter with a 4-bladed single
main rotor and an anti-torque tail rotor, powered by two T700-GE-401C turbo-shaft
engines. The drive system of the UH-1Y was identical to the AH-1Z, which included the
main rotor, transmission, tail rotor drive system, and tail boom. The UH-1Y also had a
new fuel system with 380 gallons of internal fuel, provisions for 10 newly developed
crashworthy troops seats, and a permanent fast rope installation. In addition, the UH-1Y
was equipped with a new integrated cockpit that included upgrades to the
communication, navigation, and electronic warfare systems. The UH-1Y also had a four
axis stability and control augmentation system. The UH-1Y length with rotors turning
was approximately 58 feet, and the height to the top of the main rotor hub was 13 feet 3
inches. Maximum gross weight, jacking weight, and towing weight was 18,500 pounds.
Specification mission takeoff gross weights for the UH-1Y ranged from 17,603 pounds to
18,098 pounds. A complete description of the UH-1Y aircraft is contained references 1
and 3. One of the test aircraft, Bu No. 166476, is pictured in Figure 2.
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Photo by Troy Lancaster, H-1 Upgrades

FIGURE 1: AH-1Z SUPER COBRA

Photo by Troy Lancaster, H-1 Upgrades

FIGURE 2: UH-1Y IROQUOIS
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DESCRIPTION OF BLADE FOLD SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
GENERAL

The H-1 Upgrades aircraft utilized the same main rotor system on both aircraft
types. The main rotor system was designed to fold in order to save space on the flight
and hangar decks aboard ship, and in order to be quickly deployable after air transport
within a C-17 or other large cargo aircraft. However, in order to save weight, cost, and
complexity, the program office and BHTI decided very early in the development program
not to incorporate an automatically folding rotor system. Most ship-based helicopters at
the time were using an automatic folding rotor system. This would prove to be a driving
decision later in the program. Instead of an automatic folding system, a manual folding
main rotor system with electric assist was designed and implemented. The electric assist
consisted of two parts; a flight control indicator on the cockpit display, to assist the
operator in correctly placing the cyclic stick for folding; and an electric blade pin pulling
motor. All movement, folding, and securing of the rotor blades was manual.
The main rotor had four blades, and each was marked with a color for recognition.
The blue and red blades were the two folding blades, opposite each other on the rotor
system, and were equipped with the electric pin pulling motors. Each main rotor blade
consisted of an inboard cuff section and an outboard blade. The motors and pins were
located at the junction of the blade to the cuff. This junction can be seen in Figure 1 and
Figure 2 as the enlarged area at roughly 25% span from rotor hub to blade tip. The
orange and green blades were the non-folding blades and manual removal of the blade
pin was required in the event that these blades were to be folded or removed.
6

The blade fold support equipment for one aircraft consisted of three main parts:
two BFRs, two rotor brake locking tools, and the blade support pole. All three segments
were required to support one folding evolution on one aircraft, as well as some additional
equipment and tools. The equipment is described in the following paragraphs.

BLADE FOLD RACKS
The BFRs consisted of a large “strongback” frame with a blade securing jaw that
attached at the top. One BFR was to be pinned in place on the aircraft nose and another
on the tail boom, and once the rotor blades were indexed into the jaws atop the BFRs, the
jaws were locked down, securing the blades. Longitudinal stability of the racks was
provided by an angle brace that pinned in place farther inboard on the nose or tail boom.
In addition, a second blade securing jaw could be pinned in place to provide a locking
jaw for each of the remaining two blades, if desired. See Figure 3 for a graphical
representation of the strongback with both attached blade securing jaws.
As a result of the nature of the rotor design and the folding mechanism, the
folding blades had to slide through the jaws as the rotor was indexed. The blade (one
front and one back) slid across the trailing edge roller, which also served to hold the rotor
blade in the rack. The roller also provided the folding moment on the blade and as the
blade folded, the roller aligned the blades in pairs, two forward and two aft. As a result
of the need for the blade to slide, the blade jaws had delryn pads placed on the upper and
lower surfaces, to reduce friction and to avoid damage to the blade.
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Blue/Red blade clamp

Hinge Locations

Trailing edge
roller

Green/Orange blade clamp
(heavy weather only)

Jacking pole

Speed Handle

Aircraft attachment
points

FIGURE 3: BLADE FOLD RACK

In order to reduce the force required throughout the blade fold evolution, the racks
provided a jacking mechanism to lift the blades prior to unpinning and folding the main
rotor. The jacking was provided by a coarse threaded shaft, which was actuated using a
speed wrench in a standard ½” square drive at the base of the BFR. Late in the design
cycle, a clip was added to secure the speed wrench to the BFR, for convenience.
The second blade securing jaw was used in the heavy weather configuration, and
was similar to the first in method of operation. It could be pinned in place after the
strongback and first jaws were already installed. Three pin locations were required, two
on the vertical support and one on the other side of the strongback, at the base of the
jacking pole. The heavy weather rack did not provide jacking; the blade had to be lifted
8

slightly to install the jaw. Once in place and supporting the blade, the arm across the top
of the heavy weather rack was pinned in place.

ROTOR BRAKE LOCKING TOOLS
The H-1 Upgrades aircraft were each provided with a rotor brake, but the rotor
brake would not maintain hydraulic pressure when the aircraft was off, and so it did not
provide a reliable means of securing the main rotor against rotational freeplay, or chatter.
As a result, a rotor brake locking tool (RBLT) was developed. Two RBLTs were
required to properly secure the main rotor, one to restrain the main rotor from rotational
movement in each direction. The RBLTs were bolted to the rotor brake discs inside the
aircraft panels, and locked the main rotor by securing the brake disc from freeplay.

BLADE SUPPORT POLE
In order to ensure that the rotor blades engaged smoothly into the BFRs, a blade
support pole, or “crutch pole” was provided. This allowed a crewmember to hold the tip
of the blade while standing on the ground, to minimize vertical flapping of the blade and
the risk of damage to the blade. The crutch pole was approximately 8 feet long and was
designed to slide over the tip of the rotor blade. Later in the design and test process, a net
was added to the crutch pole to keep it from sliding too far onto the rotor blade, which
could result in damage to the main rotor trim tab. Also, a second, longer pole (17 feet
long) was later added to allow a second crewmember to push or pull on the main rotor
blade from the ground.
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ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT
In the normal configuration, the folding blade was secured in the BFR while the
non-folding blade was strapped to the BFR. The strap was applied by throwing a leader
over the rotor blade and pulling the strap across. The leader was weighted with lead shot
sewn into the material at the end of the leader. Once in place, the strap was pinned below
the blade on the BFR. This provided enough downward force to minimize blade flapping
in windy conditions and to keep the restrained blade from contacting the BFR in
moderate weather and wind conditions.
When the rotor blades were not folded, the rotor tips were secured using a “sack”
that slipped over the rotor tip and was tied back to the skids. Each rotor blade had one tip
sock. This configuration was used in benign weather and wind conditions for short-term
storage of the aircraft in the fully spread condition.

SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS
Normal Weather
The blade fold support equipment was designed to work with several
configurations. The first, and most common configuration was the “normal weather”
configuration. This was the fastest folded condition to apply and was versatile enough to
suffice in nearly all weather conditions. In the normal weather configuration, the blue
and red blades are folded and secured in the BFRs, while the orange and green blades
remain unfolded and are secured by a large nylon strap to the BFR. The normal weather
configuration was designed to restrain the rotor in winds up to 60 knots in any direction,
10

Photo by Troy Lancaster, H-1 Upgrades

FIGURE 4: AH-1Z IN THE NORMAL WEATHER CONFIGURATION

as well as during aircraft movement and elevator operations. The straps, used only in the
normal weather configuration, were yellow, and are shown in Figure 4.
Heavy Weather
The other configuration often used was the heavy weather configuration. In the
heavy weather configuration, the blue and red blades are folded and secured by the BFRs,
as in the normal weather configuration, but the orange and green blades are also secured
by the secondary racks of the BFRs, which had to be added to the strongback. The
orange and green blades remained unfolded and aligned fore and aft. This configuration
of the SE was designed to withstand winds up to 100 knots in any direction. This
required that in the heavy weather configuration, all four main rotor blades were secured
by locking jaws on a rigid metal frame. In Figure 5, the heavy weather racks can be seen
securing the unfolded blades of the main rotor. Because the heavy weather jaws were not
11

Photo by Matthew Funk, H-1 Upgrades

FIGURE 5: UH-1Y IN THE HEAVY WEATHER CONFIGURATION

provided jacking, the orange and green blades had to be lifted into place using the blade
support pole. The heavy weather jaws are the lower rack on both the front and rear BFR.

Air Transportability
The final configuration of the blade fold support equipment was the air
transportability configuration, in which all four blades are folded and secured by the
BFRs. This configuration is similar to the heavy weather configuration, except that the
remaining two blades are folded in order to further reduce the overall width of the folded
aircraft. The same BFR hardware was employed as in the heavy weather configuration,
and the same basic rack as the normal weather configuration.

Folding of the two

additional blades required manual removal of the blade restraining pins on the green and
orange blades, because only the red and blue blades were equipped with pin-pulling
motors, so it was a labor-intensive process and was not often utilized.

In the air

transportability configuration, the system was designed to withstand large vertical,
12

Figure from reference 15

FIGURE 6: AH-1Z IN THE AIR TRANSPORTABILITY CONFIGURATION

lateral, and longitudinal forces, as well as vibrations, but not high wind and weather
loads. Figure 6 shows the air transportability configuration (reference 15).

H-1 UPGRADES MAIN ROTOR FOLDING PROCEDURE
The first step in the main rotor folding procedure was to position the main rotor
swash plate for the fold. This was accomplished on hydraulic power, by positioning the
pilot’s cyclic stick in a location indicated by the pilot display panel. Once in place, the
cyclic was pinned at its base and hydraulic power was secured. The main rotor blades
were pre-positioned with the red and blue blades in the front right and back left
quadrants. Next, the BFRs were assembled and installed on the aircraft. The rack on the
aircraft nose was pinned at its base and raised into position, and the angle brace was
added last. On the aft rack, the angle brace and one of the base pins, both on the same
side of the aircraft, were secured. The BFR was then rotated in to position and the
13

second base pin was installed. Once the main rotor was in position and the BFRs were in
place, two of the main rotor blades (the red and blue blades) were positioned into the fold
racks, and the jacking pole was used to raise the red and blue blades into position for the
fold.

Jacking was provided to relieve stress on the attachment points, and was

accomplished by hand, using a ratchet-style driving handle, or speed handle. The rotormounted electric motors would then pull one of the two blade retaining pins on each of
the secured blades, leaving the red and blue blades attached by one pin each. The
remaining pin served as the pivot point for folding the blade. In the original design, the
main rotor would then be indexed clockwise (counter-rotation) by manually turning the
tail rotor, while the folding blades remained secured by the racks, forcing the blades to
fold about the remaining blade retaining pin. See Figure 7 and Figure 8 for a graphical
representation of the fold sequence.

14

Front BFR

Aft BFR

FIGURE 7: BLADE FOLD SEQUENCE

Figure sourced from BHTI,
modified by Matthew Funk

Photo by Troy Lancaster, H-1 Upgrades

FIGURE 8: BLADE FOLD PROCESS
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CHAPTER 2: CONFLICTING DESIGN REQUIREMENTS

The design requirements of the blade fold support equipment were overwhelming.
The system was supposed to be functional in the normal weather, the heavy weather, and
the air transportability configurations, in all weather states, in all loading conditions, and
durable enough to last the life of the aircraft in highly corrosive and harsh environments.
It was to require minimal manpower for installation and removal, and yet had to be
installed and removed very quickly to support a high operational tempo. It had to be
lightweight yet extremely strong, simple yet durable, and secure yet adaptable.

VERSATILITY
The blade fold system was required to be extremely versatile. It had to support
the normal weather, heavy weather, and air transportability configurations of two
different aircraft. It had to allow the blades to be jacked up during the fold sequence and
had to allow the folding blade to slide through the BFR as the rotor was indexed into
position. The racks had to be simple enough for rapid installation but complex enough to
support a dynamic process in three folded configurations on two aircraft. This alone was
enough to require a complex piece of machinery.

STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY
The blade fold system also had to withstand significant axial loads, due to wind,
vibration, and normal load factors applied to the blades.

The heavy weather

configuration had to use the same base unit as the normal weather configuration for
16

simplicity, but also had to withstand 100 kt winds from any direction. The forces that
result from 100 knots of wind across the two main rotor blades were astounding – 1074 lb
in the vertical axis and 223 lb horizontal (15).

The same rack had to withstand

longitudinal and lateral loadings, as well as a +4.5 to -2.0 g vertical load factor and ±3.0 g
horizontal load factor during air transportability, which resulted in up to 1,918 lb applied
at one of the tailboom attachment fittings (15). The unnecessarily excessive structural
strength requirements resulted in an over-designed and heavy BFR.

EASE OF USE
The racks were required to be single man portable, which meant that they were
supposed to weigh less than 50 pounds per piece of equipment. The number of pieces
had to be kept to a minimum to ensure rapid installation and to minimize the aircraft
specific tools and support equipment requirements. The racks had to provide ample grip
to be installed at night and in the rain and winds, and they had to be very clearly marked
for the same reasons. The racks were to be designed so as to minimize the number of
flight deck crewmembers that were required for installation. They needed to be installed
from ground level, to minimize risk of injury to personnel and also to speed the process
of installation. For ease of use, the BFRs needed to be simple, clearly marked, and userfriendly. Unfortunately, this was quite difficult, given the complexity that was required
by the requirement for versatility.

17

AIRCRAFT INTERFACE
The blade fold racks had a pre-determined aircraft interface, because the aircraft
design was finalized. There were three attachment points available for each rack, two
directly under the rack and one closer to the aircraft center for the angle brace. The
limited freedom of aircraft interface limited the design of the racks. The installation
procedures had to be simple for speed and ease of use. The racks were not to interfere
with aircraft equipment or procedures, and needed to minimize the risk of inadvertent
damage to the aircraft. The racks needed to be gentle on the rotor blades, and yet had to
secure them in extreme conditions and loading. The nature of the fold procedure required
that the blades be able to slide through the rack during the fold process. This was
possibly the most significant hurdle to overcome, because it was nearly impossible to
design a rack that held the blades securely in a variety of conditions, yet still allowed
them to slide freely during the process.

SHIP INTERFACE
The blade fold racks were required to be stored on the ship, and because interior
storage is of such high value, the racks will inevitably spend a lot of time outside in the
salt-water environment. The racks needed to minimize the required storage and logistical
footprint, as well as the amount of new or specific tools required. The racks needed to be
easily pre-staged for aircraft before arrival, and they needed to utilize a safe installation
procedure. The racks needed to be quickly and easily moveable in order to facilitate
aircraft movement on the flight deck. The ship interface requirements demanded a

18

simple, robust design that was small and durable.

This conflicted with other

requirements that drove a more complex, bulky design.

ENVIRONMENTS
The racks were required to withstand prolonged use in a military environment by
the USMC, in all deployment areas. The required environments included desert, at sea,
mountains, and arctic locations. The racks were not provided storage crates and so they
would be subject to the ambient environment at all times. The marines found that the
best place for storage of the racks aboard ship was in the unoccupied aircraft parking
spot. This requires the racks to be chained down to the abrasive flight deck and subject to
wind, sun, rain, and sea spray at all times. The racks had to have minimal maintenance,
and yet they had moving components that must be reliable. They were also so big that
the racks had to be pre-staged before aircraft arrival at an operational area; they were too
big to be carried inside the aircraft. This is a significant logistical impact on military
operations and supportability of the H-1 Upgrades aircraft because it meant that another
aircraft or vehicle must move the support equipment to the desired aircraft location,
before the aircraft can deploy to that location. This required that the racks be extremely
robust to tolerate the harsh environments, which was in direct conflict with the
requirements for moving parts and multiple configurations, which require maintenance to
ensure reliability.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

INADEQUATE EVALUATION
One of the complicating factors throughout the H-1 Upgrades program was the
fact that the BFRs were never fully evaluated. Throughout the flight test program, no
dedicated set of tests was conducted with the goal of fully evaluating the BFRs. A small
set of testing was conducted under the “Force to Fold” investigation described later in
this paper. Several modifications to the aircraft and BFR were considered and briefly
evaluated, but only with the objective of reducing the force required to fold; this
investigation did not address the adequacy of the BFRs to support day-to-day fleet
operations. The racks were evaluated partially during crew proficiency training prior to
the initial shipboard tests of the aircraft, or “Sea Trials”, but by that time the program was
in its final phases of aircraft evaluation, and the purpose of the exercise was crew training
on the current system, not evaluation and improvement of the system.
The racks were never allocated a dedicated evaluation with trained test personnel
that would have given credibility and significance to the evaluation. No cognizant test
engineer/system expert was assigned or tasked with evaluation of the racks, which would
have resulted in recommendations to the program office to correct the deficiencies.
There was no evaluation performed by trained test pilots or test engineers, because the
only crew qualified for installation of the racks onto the aircraft was the Marine
maintenance crew. This meant that all evaluations were performed by non-test personnel.
No rating scale could be applied to the task, so very little quantitative data could be
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compiled. Data gathering was performed by observation and by interviews of users’ likes
and dislikes of the system.
Significant use data and user comments were attained during Sea Trials. This
evaluation included a four-hour meeting in which the operational users of the equipment
spoke to the author (Sea Trials lead) and the BFR designer, during which time the users
listed all deficiencies and shortcomings of the existing equipment. Again, all comments
were subjective opinions of the maintenance crew, and not quantified by a rating scale,
test instrument, or formal evaluation training. However, these were experienced users
familiar with a wide range of support equipment throughout the Navy/Marine Corps fleet.
The list of shortcoming is included in the appendix of this report.
INTERVIEWS
Several interviews were conducted, which are referenced in the “Works
Consulted” of this paper. The litany of design requirements became apparent during an
interview with Mr. Mike Southerland, the designer of the final BFR, during Sea Trials in
May 2005. The primary research interview was with Mr. Jack Greely. Mr. Greely was
the SE lead for the H-1 Upgrades program, and has spent over 20 years working with
support equipment, primarily for helicopter development programs. Mr. Greely was a
member of the H-1 Upgrades team for four years prior to the author’s involvement, and
his extensive e-mail records and meeting notes were consulted, as well. Additional
interviews were conducted with H-1 pilots, ship deck handlers, and flight deck personnel.
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ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
Additional research was also conducted to determine the source of the BFR
design requirements. The requirements for weather conditions first arrive in the program
specifications (references 4 and 5), but it is unknown how or why they were added to the
aircraft specifications. There were no requirements for the implementation of the folding
process, only that the main rotor was required to fold and could use a combination of
automatic and manual means. The implementation of the folding rotor was the result of a
design trade study by Bell Helicopter, which was not releasable to the author.
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CHAPTER 4: DESIGN ITERATIONS

INITIAL DESIGN
The initial design of the BFRs, shown in Figure 9, was created by Norco, Inc., and
delivered in 2002. The racks did not meet the majority of the users’ requirements and
were too large and cumbersome for safe installation. This failure was the first sign of
difficulty in development of a satisfactory BFR. The H-1 Upgrades team and BHTI
collectively decided that not only were the racks too deficient for fielding, but that an
entirely new design was required. In addition, a “tiger team” was assembled of senior
government and contractor personnel that determined that the best course of action was
for Bell Aero, a division of BHTI, to build the racks. Little space in this paper is devoted
to the initial Norco design, because it was delivered and rejected before the author came
aboard the program. Nevertheless, it is notable that the first attempt to design a set of
blade fold racks with the given design requirements was a complete failure, and
modification was not feasible.

The first iteration was so bad that it was scrapped

completely. It is also notable that the original design is similar in form to the final BFE.
SECOND DESIGN
The second iteration, designed and build by Bell Aero, was much closer to the
most recent design iteration than the original Norco racks.

The functionality was

essentially the same as the most resent design, but additional effort was made to keep the
racks as small and portable as possible. This design iteration utilized a three-piece main
rack for portability (strongback and two jaw assemblies), the jacking pole for relief of
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Photo by Jack Greely, H-1 Upgrades

FIGURE 9: ORIGINAL BFR DESIGN
stress on the restraining pins, and a roller design to allow the blades to translate
longitudinally as they fold. Users soon found that assembly of the strongback to the
jacking pole was tedious, and were soon leaving the two pieces together as one assembly.
The heavy weather assembly was added as needed. The RBLT was also tedious to
install, and users soon found that one RBLT was not enough; two were required.
This design iteration got much closer to meeting the main requirements than
before, but still fell significantly short. The rack was too heavy, requiring a minimum of
two marines to move each of the racks to the aircraft, plus one more if the heavy weather
jaws were required. The design required a man to climb aloft in heavy weather to secure
the unfolded blades in the heavy weather configuration. The strongback physically
interfered with the target sight system on the AH-1Z. It could also be dropped during
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installation, resulting in damage to the expensive aircraft windscreen. The racks were not
marked for installation, making the process more difficult than was necessary. The racks
consisted of three separate parts that were to be pinned together after installation of the
strongback. These pins had to be accounted for at all times and the holes on mating
pieces were difficult to line up during assembly, particularly at night. The rotor brake
locking tools, though functional, required removal of an aircraft panel for access to each
of the rotor brake discs, and the panel could not be replaced once the RBLT was installed.
In a long-term application, this would have allowed corrosion and foreign objects to get
inside the aircraft structure and result in an undetermined amount of long-term damage.
The RBLTs also required additional tools that were not in the current shipboard
inventory, which was an additional logistical and supportability impact.

BFR 4 AND BFR 5
BFR 4 and BFR 5 were delivered in spring 2005 and still failed to meet the
impossible set of requirements, though improvements had been made.

Design

modifications had been made to address usability, things like markings for installation,
grip tape, cables for the removable pins, and attachment points on the rack for storage of
the BFR specific tools. However, the racks were still too heavy for a single man to carry
and install, they still required additional tooling, and they still presented a risk of damage
to aircraft if they were not installed properly. Mating parts were still difficult to pin
together. The racks still required that a man climb aloft to secure the heavy weather
racks, and the installation procedure of the RBLTs was still cumbersome and clumsy.
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BLADE FOLD FORCE INVESTIGATION
During the build up to the program’s initial shipboard suitability tests (sea trials),
many blade folding evolutions were performed for proficiency of the deck crew and to
ensure that the aircraft and equipment was robust. Throughout these evolutions, the tail
rotor was being hand-turned to index the main rotor, and it became apparent that the
forces applied to the tail rotor were possibly damaging. The BHTI rotor and drive
systems group was asked what the limit of tail rotor applied force was, and they
determined that in order to prevent damage to the tail rotor, the force applied at the tail
rotor tip must be limited to 100 lbs. A series of tests determined that the main rotor could
not be reliably folded within the 100 lb force limitation. This meant that the existing
blade fold procedures were inadequate and could result in major damage to the aircraft if
continued. In addition, the test aircraft at this time were stored in hangars and not
exposed to rain, dirt, or corrosion.

It was obvious that in a dirty or corrosive

environment, the forces would increase as the moving parts corroded, which would
subsequently increase the force required and risk of major aircraft damage in an
operational environment.

Additional testing ensued, in an effort to find a way to

minimize the amount of force required to fold the main rotor blades. The following
methods were attempted, but would ultimately fail to reduce the force to an acceptable
level. With each attempt, multiple folding and unfolding evolutions were conducted to
determine the effect on the required force. In most cases, the aircraft was flown between
each fold cycle, to maintain more operationally representative data.
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REDUCED TORQUE ON BLADE PINS
The first suggestion by BHTI to reduce the blade folding force required was to
reduce the applied torque on the blade retaining pins, which would have reduced the
friction in the pivot joint. A series of folding evolutions was conducted at multiple levels
of reduced pin torque. Each time, the pins were removed and re-installed at a new torque
setting, at decreasing percentages of the original torque. Some benefit was realized, but
not enough to eliminate the risk to the tail rotor. Moreover, this approach would have
required a completely new set of development tests on the main rotor, resulting in
significant schedule slip and funding required. The long-term effects of reduced torque
on rotor behavior and fatigue were unknown. Reduced blade pin torque was not feasible
and did not improve the problem.

JACKING HEIGHT EFFECTS
During discussions of the force to fold, it was noted that the jacking position of
the main rotor blades for folding might not be the ideal position to minimize forces. The
procedure had always been to raise the jacking pole as high as it would go, but the height
of the rack had been determined based on fatigue life of the pin pulling motor, and once a
height was found that met the requirements, the “ideal” rotor blade height had never been
determined.

In addition, during the rotor design, the blades had been predicted to

statically droop less than they actually did, so the computer model of the rotor could not
be used to determine the theoretical best location because it did not have an accurate
representation of static rotor blade characteristics. Subsequently, a six-inch extension to
the jacking pole was created in order to evaluate the effects of jacking height. Because
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the movement of the jacking pole was greater than six inches, the extension allowed
testers to evaluate any height from the full down position to six inches above the
maximum height of the jacking pole. Folding evolutions were conducted at various
heights above and below the full extension height of the jacking pole, in approximately ½
inch increments. Some improvement was realized when the height of the jacking pole
was three rotations of the jacking handle below the full extension location, about one-half
inch below full extension. As in the case of the rotor pin torque investigation, this effect
was insignificant in the overall force required to fold the blades and a full investigation of
jacking effects was not completed. Jacking height effects were not significant enough to
correct the problem.

LUBRICATION
Another potential method of reducing the force required to fold was to lubricate
the pivot location of the main rotor. This method was attempted in conjunction with the
investigation of reduced blade pin torque, in the hope that a reduction in torque with an
applied lubricant may solve the problem. Initially, in the hangar, lubrication seemed to
reduce the required forces. Unfortunately, the test team found that once the aircraft was
released for flight, the lubrication attracted dirt and grime, resulting in an increase in
force required to fold.

Once the rotor components were removed, cleaned, and

reassembled without the lubricant, the force required returned to its original levels.
Moreover, the application of lubricant would have been a new maintenance procedure
that would have been required on every fold evolution, requiring additional man power
for support, further increasing the time required to unfold and prep the aircraft for flight,
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and adding a risky procedure that required a man to climb atop the aircraft during every
fold operation.

Lubrication of the rotor parts increased required maintenance and

contributed to the problem of excessive force required to fold the blades.

SWASH PLATE RIGGING
BHTI conducted an investigation of various main rotor swash plate positions in an
attempt to reduce the force required to fold. The BFRs were designed for the main rotor
to be perpendicular to the rotor mast, in order to minimize torsion on the pivot point and
vertical motion of the folding blades throughout the fold. In the tested configuration, the
pinning locations of the cyclic did not result in a perpendicular orientation of the rotor
plane to the rotor mast. The evaluation of swash plate position resulted in a significant
reduction of force. In the tested conditions the force required dropped from 135 lb
required to 97 lb. However, a change in the cyclic pinning positions would have required
a flight control software change as well as a hardware change, and was deemed
inappropriate for implementation prior to sea trials and OPEVAL. In addition, a force
required of 97 lb was not considered to be sufficiently low, because the team agreed that
forces would climb in an operational environment, so forces in the hangar conditions
needed to be consistently much lower than the 100 lb limit. Swash plate rigging showed
the most potential for at least partial correction of the excessive force requirement, but
still did not make enough of an impact to solve the problem.
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A FINAL ATTEMPT
As a final attempt to mitigate the force to fold, Bell Aero sent the BFR designer to
Pax River to modify the BFRs. The blade contact points were modified with a larger,
low friction, contact pad. This would have reduced the secure attachment of the blade by
the rack, because a soft neoprene-type compound was used for the blade contact patch.
The roller was modified with a harder compound in an attempt to keep the rotor trailing
edge from “digging in” to the roller. The result of this evaluation was that, as with the
investigation of lubricants, the force required to fold the rotor increased. A small benefit
was realized in certain circumstances, but in most evolutions, the force remained the
same or was greater than before the modification.

ADDITION OF BLADE HANDLING POLE
Finally, after all the investigations of methods to reduce the force required to fold,
BHTI and Bell Aero determined that there was no feasible way to consistently reduce the
force to an acceptable level. The only way to fold the blades, then, was by application of
force directly to the main rotor blade instead of using the tail rotor. Consideration was
given to use of a rope tied to the top of the crutch pole, but during shipboard operations
the rope handler would be at risk of falling overboard. Deck handlers needed to be able
to push on the blades during folding instead of pulling on it. In order to accomplish this,
another piece of support equipment was developed. The blade handling pole was a
seventeen-foot long metal pole that attached near top of the blade support pole. This
meant that two people were now required to support the main rotor blade, one on the
support pole to limit the vertical deflection of the main rotor blade, and another on the
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blade-handling pole applying the force. In addition, while aboard ship, the blades on one
side of the aircraft are not over the flight deck so application of force on the outboard
blades was impossible. The blade handling pole can be seen in use in Figure 10.
The results of this approach were that 1) an additional piece of equipment was
required to the already cumbersome list of equipment, 2) an additional person was
required to complete the blade fold procedure, and 3) the risk of damage to the aircraft
still existed, if a deck crewman attempted to index the main rotor using the tail rotor.
This approach, while functional, was a work around at best. It solved none of the
problems and required a significant increase in effort and equipment.

Photo by Troy Lancaster, H-1 Upgrades

FIGURE 10: BLADE SUPPORT POLE AND BLADE HANDLING POLE IN USE
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The following results, discussion, and conclusions are the sole opinion of the
author, based on his analysis of the program issues. They do not represent the views or
intentions of the H-1Upgrades program office or of BHTI. The following paragraphs
present an analysis of contributing factors that led ultimately to the development of BFE
that were unsuitable for operational use, followed by a recommended set of design
compromises. Throughout the course of design iterations, no attempt was made to
compromise design requirements in order to achieve success, and no effort was placed on
investigation of possible aircraft modifications that could minimize the blade folding
associated problems. The only way to field a successful set of BFE was to limit the
requirements of the equipment, so that a robust, lightweight, simple BFR could be
fielded.

USERS DISSATISFIED
The true judge of the BFRs will ultimately be the end user, the USMC support
crew that will use the equipment on a daily basis. The Marines are known for finding a
way to make something work. Still, during the sea trials test period, the author hosted a
meeting to discuss the feasibility of the BFR design as the long-term solution for fleet
use. The result of two hours of discussion was a list of 23 deficiencies and issues with
the design.

The marines felt that the BFRs were completely inadequate for fleet

introduction. Some of the noted deficiencies of the tested design are listed below:
1. Inadequate blade protection on the forward and aft heavy weather rack.
32

2. Interference of the jacking pole with the heavy weather rack blade attachment.
3. Inadequate handles on the blade handling pole.
The full list of noted blade fold SE issues can be found in the appendix of this
paper. These noted deficiencies are significant in nature and are spread across all aspects
of the BFE. The marines who were aboard the ship during sea trials and participated in
this meeting were part of the operational test squadron that would provide the final
evaluation of the aircraft. Nine months later, when the aircraft entered OPEVAL and was
turned over to these same marines, the BFE remained unchanged.

Although the

OPEVAL report is not yet released, it is reasonable to conclude that the same Marines
will still consider the BFRs inadequate.

COMPROMISE
The history of the BFE has been one of compromise. The initial decision to
design a manual folding system was a compromise against cost. The design requirement
to support multiple configurations and all weather conditions was a compromise of
commonality and simplicity in support equipment requirements. The system restraints
are summarized well in reference 8, which was a trip report by the BFR designer
following the final attempt to modify the BFE. The purpose of this trip and BFR
modification was to determine the feasibility of multiple options for reduction in the
force required to fold the H-1 Upgrades aircraft, prior to the sea trials test period. As
previously noted, the trip was not successful and led to the development of the blade
handling pole as a work around solution. The summary is below:
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“The H-1 upgrade Aircraft are required to fold with only powered Pin
Pullers. Other fleet Aircraft employ Rotor Phasing, Pitch Lock, and
Blade Sweep actuators. In addition, H-1 upgrade heavy weather
requirements are to restrain Blades without damage in 100 kt
conditions. Existing fleet Aircraft fold racks restrain only 60 kt winds.
H-1 upgrade Racks are designed to maximize commonality- one Rack
set will fold both Cobra and Huey Aircraft, for both shipboard use and
C-5 transportability. These requirements force a heavy and complex
Rack System, while maximizing Aircraft performance and reliability,
and minimizing procurement and direct operating costs.”

PRIORITIES
One of the main problems with the blade fold support equipment was the
approach that had been taken by the program. Because of the cost and magnitude of
design changes to the aircraft, there was strong reluctance to correct blade folding
problems by a change to the aircraft design, but there was no way to address the problem
through changes in the support equipment. There were simply too many requirements for
the SE to meet; it was impossible for the SE to correct deficiencies to the aircraft and
rotor system design. Throughout the program, it was always too expensive and would
have taken too long to correctly address the aircraft deficiencies. The program charter
was primarily development of a flight vehicle, and the BFRs were considered a
supportability issue, not a flight issue. This belief was so pervasive that no study was
conducted to evaluate the feasibility and cost of implementation of an automatic folding
rotor; the option was eliminated without in-depth consideration.
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COST AND SCHEDULE
Another issue that inhibited correction of the problem was that the program was
continually under schedule and budget pressure.

The general attitude was that the

program had to go forward because the end user, the USMC, needed the upgraded
aircraft, and they needed it “now”. And it was true. The USMC did need the aircraft,
and the program was under very high pressure from high-ranking officials in the
government, military, and BHTI. The program was already significantly over budget as a
result of schedule slip to more than twice the original planned timeline for aircraft
development. As a result, anything that was considered to be manageable was generally
ignored in favor of higher priority problems. The H-1 Upgrades program was at risk of
cancellation, which would have denied the marines of this much needed capability
upgrade. This manifested itself on a smaller scale, because the program had to keep
“moving forward” in order to avoid the appearance of a program that couldn’t be fixed,
and must be cancelled. This meant that interim milestones had to be met on schedule,
and in the case of sea trials, it meant performing the final evaluation on a blade fold
system that, in the opinion of the users, was not ready for fleet use. Finally, when BHTI
implemented the blade handling pole, they assured the program office that this solution
was “just for OPEVAL” and that a new design would be delivered after OPEVAL. At
the time of publishing this paper, no new support has been developed, tested, or
delivered.
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POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
REDUCED LOAD CONDITIONS
One way to improve on the BFE would be to redesign the equipment with fewer
design requirements and more freedoms of design. If the BFRs did not have to withstand
a 1.5g lateral loading in the air transportability configuration, the racks could have been
smaller and lighter. A separate set of equipment could have been added for the rarely
used configuration of air transportability.
Another way to reduce required load conditions was to support only one set of
weather conditions. The MH-60S aircraft utilizes an automatically folding rotor system
with small, lightweight blade support racks that are designed for use in winds up to 60
kts. For more extreme weather conditions, the aircraft must be stored in the hangar. If
one weather configuration had been chosen for the H-1 Upgrades, the racks would not
have been required to have a separate heavy weather rack that pinned in place; instead,
the entire rack system could have been a one piece design that was suitable for all
planned conditions.
Still another way to reduce the complexity of the BFR design was to design a
more robust main rotor, so that the folding blades could be placed in the racks after
folding rather than before. This way, the blades would not have to be allowed to move
through the racks during the fold cycle, allowing for a simple, secure blade restraint.
This too would be similar to H-60 series helicopters, in that the racks are placed on the
rotor system after the fold cycle is complete, so that once placed in the racks, the blades
never move. This change to the H-1 Upgrades would also alleviate the risk of damage to
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the tail rotor by eliminating the high force required to fold. Finally, this would have
greatly reduced the complexity of the BFR by eliminating the need for both jacking and
sliding of the rotor blade. The racks could have been a simple clamp design to secure the
blade, rather than a complicated pad and roller system.

It is possible that there would

have to be operational restrictions on the new BFRs if they were designed to a smaller
load set, but this is a trade study that never took place to determine the operational
feasibility of such a set of limits. The reduction in weather configurations could have
greatly reduced the complexity and increased reliability of the BFRs by elimination of the
moving parts on the system.
REDUCED CONFIGURATIONS
One more way to improve the functionality of the BFE would have been to limit
the number of configurations that one set of equipment needs to meet. For example, if
the racks were designed to support both aircraft type in only the normal weather
configuration, savings could be realized in weight, complexity, and ease of installation.
There is an obvious benefit to using the same set of BFRs for both the UH-1Y and the
AH-1Z, but there is limited gain by using the same set of equipment for the air
transportability configuration as in the heavy weather configuration. If the racks were not
the same set of equipment that is used for air transportability and heavy weather, the
resultant loads on the rack would be much less, resulting in a smaller and lighter BFR.
Also, the number of parts and complexity of installation could have been greatly reduced,
making the racks simpler, more robust, and more reliable.
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SIMPLIFIED DESIGN
Another way to minimize the BFE requirements list would be to simplify the
design.

Specifically, the heavy weather configuration could utilize all the same

equipment as the normal weather configuration, including the large yellow blade securing
strap, but could also implement a second, vertical brace that would attach under the
unfolded blade in nearly the same way that the current heavy weather attachment does.
The design and installation could be greatly simplified by continued use of the strap to
secure the unfolded blade, so the heavy weather support could be just a flat pad on a
vertical pole, with no need for moving, locking jaws that are difficult and time consuming
to install. The blade would be secured by the pole underneath and the strap above. The
other advantage of this approach would be that the unfolded blade would not have to be
released prior to application of the heavy weather attachment, rather, the heavy weather
support could be pinned in place while the blade remained secured by the yellow strap. It
is possible that this approach would not meet the lateral load requirements that the main
rotor will encounter in the 100 kt reverse flow wind condition, but as stated before, a
limitation could be placed on the aircraft that would require hangar storage in winds of
this magnitude. This limitation would have minimal impact on the user and is prudent
anyway.

AUTOMATIC FOLDING
A possible solution to the deficient blade fold system would have been, during
initial aircraft development, to design an automatic folding rotor system. Other shipboard
aircraft have used automatic folding four (or more) bladed rotor systems for decades. An
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automatic folding system would have been expensive to implement, and would have
carried an associated weight gain, but the benefits in shipboard suitability would have
been great. The aircraft would be able to support a greater operational tempo as a result
of faster folding and unfolding cycles. The aircraft would have required less support
maintenance as a result of the reduced manpower required for folding and unfolding.
Finally, an automatic folding rotor system would have reduced risk to aircraft and to
personnel, because of the inherently dangerous blade folding procedure.
ROTOR INDEXING MOTOR
One way to partially implement automatic folding would be to incorporate a rotor
indexing motor. This motor could automatically or manually rotate the main rotor during
the folding process. This would eliminate the need for two of the flight deck personnel,
speed up the process, and most importantly, would eliminate the risk of damage to the
aircraft tail rotor. It would also greatly speed the process of main rotor folding while still
using the existing equipment. The motor could be integrated into the rotor brake disc by
interlocking on the disc shaft or by putting teeth around the outside of the rotor brake disc
for a gear to turn the disc. The motor could also be used to eliminate the RBLT and
associated tools, if designed to lock the rotor brake in place once the fold cycle was
complete.
It is notable that this idea of a blade indexing motor is not original. Other
manufacturers have incorporated a similar design since the 1960s. The idea for automatic
indexing was proposed at preliminary design review of the H-1 Upgrades, and was
rejected. This idea would be inexpensive, simple to integrate, and would alleviate the
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most serious of the folding deficiencies. It could eliminate the need for two RBLTs per
aircraft while still utilizing the current BFRs. The current manual method could still be
used as a backup in the event that the motor didn’t work properly.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS
From the beginning, the H-1 Upgrades BFE was over-constrained by the list of
requirements that the equipment was supposed to meet.

Without an automatic blade

folding system, the aircraft SE was asked to compensate for the aircraft deficiency. That,
plus a limited budget, short schedule, and low priority inevitably resulted in a design
which, in the opinion of the author, is neither effective nor suitable for introduction to the
fleet.
The true source of the problem was the lack of implementation of the folding
mechanism into the main rotor, a problem that could have been corrected very early in
the aircraft design process. In order to meet the user requirements, the aircraft should
have had an automatic folding system with a single, secure configuration to be used
under all conditions, and a second set of equipment for air transportability. This would
have eliminated the need for moving parts on the BFE, and would have greatly reduced
the total number of parts by only supporting one configuration, instead of three. It would
have also aided in rapid installation and removal of the racks by virtue of simplicity. A
folding rotor system would have also resulted in reduced manning requirements, reduced
support equipment requirements, and a reduced aircraft logistical footprint.
Unfortunately, because of priorities, once the problems with the BFE were identified, the
program was already four years into a flight test program, and any change to the main
rotor system would have required re-qualification of the entire flight envelope - a move
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that was deemed to be far too expensive and far too high risk for the program. In
addition, the program was under schedule and budget pressure from the beginning and
therefore management was averse to major design changes if there was a potential workaround available, which there seemed to be. As a result, efforts to correct the deficiencies
in the blade fold implementation concentrated on modifications to the support equipment,
an approach that could never have corrected the root problem.
The design requirements for the BFE limited the development process from the
time when a manual folding rotor system was selected. The only way that successful
BFE could have been developed was for the program to reduce the requirements of the
BFE, to be used in a limited set of environmental conditions or a limited set of
configurations. However, by forcing designers to plan for all conditions, even those that
will be rarely or never encountered, the BFE that resulted was a set of equipment that was
ineffective in everyday use. Selection of a limited set of design requirements would have
resulted in a simple, robust, and user-friendly design that would have met the vast
majority of the desired conditions.
The force required to fold was a major aircraft problem that could not be
mitigated by changes to the support equipment. Until an aircraft change is implemented
that eliminates this problem, there will continue to be a risk of significant aircraft damage
from unacceptable forces applied to the tail rotor. A relatively easy way to solve this
problem would be to incorporate a blade indexing motor that automatically turns the
main rotor during folding evolutions. The motor could be integrated easily by applying
force to the rotor brake disc, either through teeth around the outside of the disc or by
interlock to the disc shaft.
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If the BFE had been designed for shipboard and land based storage only, and not
for air transportability, the load requirements on the BFR would have been greatly
reduced, both in the vertical and in the lateral direction. This would have allowed a much
lighter, simpler design to be implemented. If the BFE was required to support only the
normal weather configuration like other shipboard aircraft, the design could have been
one piece, with a much simpler installation and fewer parts required. And finally, if the
main rotor were more robust so that the rotor blades did not have to move through the
BFR, then the design would have been a very simple yet very secure clamp for the
blades. The combination of these three concessions would have resulted in a light,
simple, robust, and reliable design that was easy and fast to install.

RECOMMENDATIONS
The H-1 Upgrades BFE is critical to program success. The equipment affects the
aircraft readiness, deployability, and suitability. A simplified BFR design could greatly
reduce the complexity of installation and decrease the time required for before and after
flight maintenance, resulting in an increased operational tempo at no cost in manpower.
In the author’s opinion, the H-1 Upgrades program should do the following:
1.

Redesign the H-1 Upgrades main rotor to incorporate an automatic folding

rotor system.
2. Redesign the blade fold racks for a reduced set of configurations, eliminating
the air transportability and heavy weather configuration requirements for this set of
equipment.
3.

Redesign the blade fold racks using a reduced load set.
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4.

Simplify the design of the heavy weather equipment to utilize the normal

configuration equipment with an additional vertical brace.
5.

Consider changes to the main rotor system to allow the blades to be placed

in the blade fold rack at the completion of the folding process, rather than at the
beginning.
6.

Consider a simple, one-piece, clamping blade fold rack.

7.

Consider incorporation of an automatic blade indexing motor.
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TABLE 1: BFR 4 AND 5 DEFICIENCIES
ISSUE
NO.

FFR-001
/ #1 & 6
& 28 &
43

FFR-002
/ #29

FFR-003
/ #3

FFR-004
/ #4 & 5
& 50

DEFICIENCY

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The BFR attach fittings that mate to the
A/C hoop fittings (ref. 449-030-156-103/104) exhibited an extremely tight fit during
aircraft fit checks. These fittings are
present on both the left and right hand side
of the aircraft. Both fits with the aircraft
were tight.
The BFR attach fitting that mates to the
A/C clevis fitting (ref. 449-030-160-103)
exhibited an extremely tight fit during
aircraft fit checks. The fitting mates into a
clevis fitting on the aircraft that has over
time, had lots of paint build-up. The fitting
on the BFR is designed to fill the width of
the clevis, generating a nice solid fit.
Minimal play in the fitting is desired during
loading of the rack in the fore/aft direction.
Three different assemblies that possess
telescoping features on the BFR have a soft
captivation method that appears to be
insufficient. The assemblies have a springloaded ball detent that, if telescoped too far,
engages a hole in the outer tube and
prevents the tube from dropping out of the
assembly. During the design phase,
stainless steel ball detents were selected for
their corrosion preventative characteristics.
However, during the assembly phase of
BFRs CK001, CK002, and CK003, it was
noted that these stainless steel detent balls
were scoring the interior surfaces of the
tubes they were mounted into. As a result,
the detents were threaded down into their
housing to reduce this condition. The
captivation effectiveness was affected as a
result during the functional testing. Fast
tube extraction yields inadequate
captivation.
The telescoping features on the strut
assemblies of both the forward rack and the
aft rack seem to bind during adjustment.
The inner tube of the extended blade
support assembly also requires a better wear
surface due to repeated plunging during
adjustment.
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Slightly modify the tolerance of the BFR
fittings to provide a tiny bit more clearance.
Additionally, surface finish will be removed on
the BP from the lower region of the part. The
existing parts are 17-4PH, and are corrosion
resistant.

Slightly modify the tolerance of the BFR
fitting to provide a tiny bit more clearance.

Switch the spring loaded ball detents to
acetyl, and adjust to proper height per drawing
requirements. The scoring problem will be
corrected through a material change, and the
tube captivation effectiveness will be increased
as a result of properly adjusting the spring
plungers to the correct height.

Provide supplemental acetyl wear surfaces,
where applicable. Hard anodize inner tube
surfaces to provide better wear surface
characteristics.

TABLE 1: CONTINUED
ISSUE
NO.

DEFICIENCY

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The strongback assembly of both the
FFR-005 forward rack and the aft rack should possess
/ #7
knurling in the region of common handhold areas.
The jacking pole contains a swivel
assembly that interfaces the blade-handling
pole. This interface is designed to allow an
operator to install or remove the BFR
system from either the aft or forward
FFR-006 position, on either aircraft. The swivel
/ #8
interface is difficult engage when the BFR,
(fore or aft) is already installed onto the
aircraft.
The swaged ball cable assembly that
resides at the outboard end of the folding
blade clamp assembly binds slightly when
FFR-007
adjusted to/from the different available
/ #12
positions. The swaged balls bind in the root
of the “butterfly” fitting located on the end
of the lower arm of the folding blade clamp.
Strap storage for the folding blade strap
throw-over. The current design does not
FFR-008 have a storage location for the straps. The
/ #13
straps are very long, and easily become
entangled around objects and people when
left un-stored.
The throw-over portion of the extended
blade strap seems marginally long. The
throw-over process requires a longer piece
of lead material because the strap itself is
too heavy, and presents too much
“windage” in a shipboard environment to
throw over repeatedly. In addition, the
overall length of the load carrying portion
FFR-009
of the strap was too long to effectively
/ #19 &
restrain the blade.
27 & 38
& 56
Another design suggestion from the
customer included modifying the length of
the extension portion of the strap to allow
operator to walk the strap over the tip of the
blade. This is not recommended because
damage to the trim tabs could occur with
the strap in close proximity during this type
of procedure.
The extended blade strap support had
problems feeding its way over the trailing
FFR-010
edge of the extended blade once thrown
/ #17
over the top. The width variations provide
edges that snag on the trailing edge.
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Add non-skid tape to required regions.
Knurling cannot be accomplished on existing
units, therefore non-skid tape applied to the
region will provide the required grip.
Encourage BFR operators to practice using
this method. This tool feature was under
utilized during the functional testing. More
practice by operators may reveal that the
functionality of the swivel is adequate.
Therefore, no rework unless additional
information comes out of sea trials.
Modify the dimensions of the butterfly fitting
so that the swaged ball cable assembly can slip
into position a little easier. Consideration will
have to be given to the overall stability of the
design. In other words, the stability of the
swaged ball in the butterfly fitting, once the arm
is in the capture or secure positions should not
be compromised to facilitate easier installation.
Allow the customer to continue using the
assembly in the current design, and possibly
develop a recommendation for improvement
based on a record of experience after sea
trials.

Lengthen the piece of throw over strap used
to facilitate the transfer of the extended blade
strap from one side of the blade to the other.

Provide a modified design that tapers and
transitions from one width to another, allowing
for better pull over of the strap across the
trailing edge.

TABLE 1: CONTINUED
ISSUE
NO.

DEFICIENCY

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The lead weight of the extended blade
FFR-011
strap support is too large in diameter. It
/ #18
presents a dent risk in its current
configuration.

Redesign the lead weight with a portion of
rubber, (i.e. rubber ball, rubber tube) consisting
of the same weight, that could be thrown over in
lieu of a bag of lead shot. This presents a
reduced risk of FOD, and potentially less
damage to the aircraft blades during throw-over.

The inner tube of the extended blade
FFR-012 support structure exhibits too much free
/ #20
movement with respect to the outer tube of
the extended blade support structure.

Increase the dimensions of the aluminum
wear pads by just enough to consume excessive
play. Add additional acetyl wear pads that
extend along the length of the tube, so that the
wear surfaces are acetyl, and the bearing
surfaces remain aluminum in those regions that
require them.

FFR-013
Rotor brake does not fit into the required
/ #21 &
envelope.
31

Redesign the rotor brake tool to properly fit
and function within the given envelope.

The NORCO pins do not store into the
FFR-014
storage utility belt bolted to the base of the
/ #65
strongback assembly.

Hard anodize the piece parts, and verify holes
will accept the current design of the NORCO
pins.

FFR-015
/ #22

The forward strongback fouled the TSS.

Redesign the strongback, (ref. HD-100020) to
allow for a modified height of the lower cross
tube. (Note: Commonality between aft and
forward strongbacks drives a small change
will have to result in the aft third strut to
maintain proper fit with aft rack).

Clearance of the forward third strut joint
FFR-016 structure with the AH-1Z canopy in the
/ #24 & extended position. Inadequate overlap
52
between the lower inner tube and the outer
tube add to this concern.

Modifications of the lower translating joint to
prevent excessive play during inboard loading.
This would entail making the interface a little
more of a lap joint, instead of the limited
overlap currently designed. Replace the
protruding heads of the fastener collar with a
riveted joint that could be shaved flush,
providing less potential of damage in the event
that contact occurs.

The engagement of the upper folding
blade clamp arm into the lower folding
FFR-017 blade clamp arm is inadequate. When
/ #25 & positioned in the capture mode, the upper
26
arm does not engage the lower arm
sufficiently to transfer folding loads in the
lower arm of the folding blade clamp.

Redesign the lower arm to allow for more
interaction between the tip of the upper arm and
the end of the lower arm on the folding blade
clamp during capture configuration.

FFR-018
Flex shaft extension arm sticks beyond
/ #30
the top of the strongback assembly.

Leave current assembly as is. The assembly
itself may be removed from the rack, and
replaced by a more common hand tool,
therefore rework to alleviate this condition
would be dependent on whether or not the
extension arm stays on the assembly at all.
(Human Factors Issue)
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TABLE 1: CONTINUED
ISSUE
NO.

DEFICIENCY

CORRECTIVE ACTION

A modification of the design might be
required based on the results of the
FFR-019
investigation. Pictures and other data from the
The design of the HD-100021-101 fitting
/ #32
functional test will be used to evaluate if the
and the mating fitting on HD-1000031 may
bushings were in fact installed prior to
foster the ‘spin-out’ of the bushings.
functional testing. If no design errors are
revealed, then the design will remain
unchanged.
The jack lockout key has a design error
FFRthat prevents the key from being locked out
020/ #33 because it is too long by .200 inches.

Modify the applicable dimension to allow
proper fit.

The lockout arm is susceptible to damage
during non-use. This is the jack lockout
Change the material and design to provide a
arm that is used to secure the jack lockout
more substantial assembly capable of more
FFR-021
key. This system is used to prevent
abuse.
downward jack drift during periods of nonuse in the loaded condition.
Investigate the possibility of powder coating
the assembly to provide a more wear resistant
finish for components of the BFR seeing contact
with the ground. Not all components of the
BFR may be candidates for powder coating,
Painted surfaces of the tool are subject to partly because of the heat required to cure the
repeated wear, partly because the tool will
finish onto the parts. Many of the BFR welded
FFR-022
see such frequent use, and also because tool assemblies are aged only at 350 degrees F. If
/ #67
is not stored in a case or other protective
the powder coating temperature is higher, or
storage media.
similar, it may have detrimental affects to the
strength. Other detriments include warpage. If
powder coating proves to be unavailable for our
applications, then the default will be to continue
using the same finishing specifications used by
all other H-1 Upgrade SE.
Modify drawing requirements to selectively
FFR-023
ID of the round tube on the welded
hard anodize ID of HD-100020-301. The
/ #68
assembly has an inadequate wear surface.
proposed solution has a $500.00 impact per
strongback.
Upper arm flexibility during fold is
unacceptable. The folding loads produced
some unexpected deflections. These
deflections may be the result of a optical
Redesign upper arm of folding blade clamp to
FFR-024 illusion resulting from the spring in the end provide additional rigidity during folding loads.
/ #35 & of the folding blade clamp to stack, thus
A re-evaluation of folding loads will be
37
resulting in rotation about the main hinge
conducted to validate folding loads that were
point of the folding blade clamp upper arm.. experienced during testing.
This rotation could be falsely perceived as
deflection. A design investigation will
reveal whether this is the case or not.
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TABLE 1: CONTINUED
ISSUE
NO.

DEFICIENCY

CORRECTIVE ACTION

FFR-025
Lower arm flexibility enhances difficulty
Modify the existing design to provide more
/ #36
during adjustment of folding blade clamp
rigidity during adjustment between
assembly from capture mode to secure
configurations.
mode.
The roller of the folding blade clamp
needs to be more substantial. The roller
FFR-026
material is currently a little too pliable for
/ #69
the loads that are exerted onto it during a
fold/unfold.

Redesign the roller to incorporate a new
material(s), less likely to gouge during
fold/unfold with the trailing edge bearing up
against it. The material selection need to also
be sensitive to the trailing edge.

The upper inboard pin on the extended
blade support clamp binds during pin
FFR-027
extraction. The pin currently locates itself
/ #70
through three close tolerance bushed holes.

Redesign to loosen the tolerances of the ream
on the bushed hole to alleviate condition.

The GF-100024-1010 assemblies were
not used. Capt. Abate requested that the
FFR-028
assemblies go away. During functional
/ #44 &
testing, Snap-On extension handles were
45 & 71
used in lieu of the designed extension arm
with no detriment to performance.

Remove and replace the designed extension
arm with an off-the-shelf Snap-On 3/8” drive
that can be stored on the rack in a similar
position. The off-the-shelf component will have
to be assigned a dash number and be made into
a “make from” assembly. Without this,
provisions cannot easily be made on the rack to
store the Snap-On component.

Redesign of the extended blade support
structure to allow for installation from the
FFR-029
ground. Captain Abate requested a
/ #42 &
complete redesign of the extended blade
48
support structure to allow for its installation
from the ground.

This is considered a new design requirement.
Discussion with the customer about use of
ladders and stands to position this component of
the BFR on onto the rack after aircraft has been
moved to off-spot. No redesign until further
evaluation of requirements has been
conducted with customer.

The separation of the dogleg fitting from
the aft NORCO pin. The captivation
method of the dogleg fitting on the forward
FFR-030 third strut has been questioned by a couple
/ #51
of operators. Some feel that the current
configuration presents a small risk of
damaging the aircraft during installation
into the aircraft fitting.

Continue to install the rack using the current
design. More definitive results with regards
to this concern will be obtained upon
completion of sea trials.

The jack lockout feature is a two-piece
operation. The current design uses a twopiece design to effectively lock out the
potential downward drift of the jacking pole
actuator during long term positioning in the
loaded condition.

Continue to use the current design. Make
more informed decisions about the design
and possibly its applicability after sea trials.
It may turn out that the actuator design will not
sufficiently drift even in the unlocked condition
to warrant the lockout device.

FFR031/ #53
& 57 &
72
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TABLE 1: CONTINUED
ISSUE
NO.

DEFICIENCY

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Marking – Marking was left off of the
functional test units to allow for real time
assessment of marking locations during the
functional test. Several recommendations
were given to help operators use the BFR
system more efficiently. Some of the
FFR-032 recommendations are as follows:
/ #54

Change design to mark with painted labels.

1. Mark the strongback to help indicate
the position of the extended blade during a
shipboard fold.· Mark each jacking pole
assembly with large letters indicating
whether it is a forward jacking pole or an
aft jacking pole.
The lower arm comes into close
proximity of the lower surface of the blade
during blade approach. The actual
clearance as measured during the functional
FFR-033 fold test was about 2 inches. This clearance
Redesign to provide a buffer surface that will
/ #15 & my not be adequate in a shipboard
protect the blade in the event of contact between
16 & 47 environment. Additionally, if procedurally the blade and the lower arm of the folding blade
& 55
clamp.
the blade is allowed to drop out of the
folding blade clamp, a potential exists to
damage the underside of the blade when the
blade contacts the lower arm of the folding
blade clamp.
The interface of the blade-handling pole
to the swivel assembly provide for an
FFR-034 awkward interface due to the length of the
pole while installing/removing onto/from
aircraft.
The interface of the blade-handling pole
to the swivel assembly provide for an
FFR-035 awkward interface due to the length of the
pole while installing/removing onto/from
aircraft.
FFR-036
The design of the blade handling pole
/ #9 &
head should be optimized to reduce weight
10 & 11
and complexity.
& 49

The interface of the blade-handling pole
FFR-037
needs a non-slip surface for better grip
/ #63
during blade control.
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No action until further data can be
obtained after sea trials.

No action until further data can be
obtained after sea trials.

Redesign the head of the blade handling pole
to reduce weight, and complexity.
Redesign to accommodate mixing grit into
the paint for that region of the tube. This would
allow for less machining, more strength, and
less weight than the knurling option. Also,
rework to existing units could be accomplished
that would match the production design change.

TABLE 1: CONTINUED
ISSUE
NO.

DEFICIENCY

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The extended blade lockout interface was
very cumbersome to use. It relies very
heavily on blade position, and should be reRedesign the interface to utilize a limited
FFR-038 evaluated. The current design relies on
adjustable rigid system in lieu of over-center
mechanism.
springs, and over-center mechanisms that
are overly complicated for the application
they serve.
aircraft
#1 / #2

Deflection of the A/C fitting and local skin
was noted during aft BFR install

(None to date.)

aircraft
#2 / 61
& 62 &
64

Air Transport configuration; change to
removing the blades?? Maj. wants to know.
Chris for action

(None to date.)

FFR - /
#39

FFR- /
#40
FFR- /
#41

issue with very loose parts during
installation of extended blade support - extended blade clamp had been unpinned on lower, upper, and diagonal arm. Issue with
the ground, and was fully broken down into loose arms hitting people as it is installed. TBD
its most ‘open’ configuration prior to
on proposed fix.
loading COULD BE INCORPORATED
INTO FFR-019
procedural or if after sea trials we need to lower
required additional personnel to support the
the clamp to accommodate the blade droop.
extended blade itself during the installation
Basic question is what will be the elevation of
of this gear
the production fixed blade be?
issue with the upper arm pad punching a
hole in the top of the blade. - upper arm was
rotated over into position

aircraft
#3 / #34
excessive force required to initiate fold & 46 &
excessive force on tail rotor
58 & 59
& 60
FFR- /
#14

The internal stop of the actuator design
needs to be reviewed for its robustness.

(None to date.)

(None to date.)

Chris will look into this with manufacturer to
make sure that the stop can tolerate the loads.
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TABLE 2: SEA TRIALS BLADE FOLD ISSUES
DEFICIENCY

DISCUSSION

Inadequate blade retention of the Blade
Handling Pole (Crutch Pole)

Although in ideal conditions the retention straps will engage
the end of the blade tip, in normal conditions the straps tend
to get out of position with the slightest misalignment of the
Pole or wind condition. A large hole meshed sock would
improve the design.

The requirement for the B-4 stand on the
flight deck for the installation of the
Extended Blade Support Assembly (Heavy
Weather Rack) is not required so long
shipboard compatible ladders are identified
for that function.

Pub issue. Eliminate the reference to the B-4 stand for the
installation of the heavy weather rack. Identify ladders
similar to the V-22 Little Giant Ladders with tie down
rings.

Inadequate design of quick release pin
installation.

A global review of the pin insertion tolerances needs to be
done. The excessive operator compensation required to
assemble the BFR is unacceptable. Although the loads need
to be addressed in the design, the capability to insert the
pins in a darkened ship environment is essential.

Inadequate design of Aft Rack telescopic
Strut Assembly

Initial discussions were in the direction of deleting the
telescopic capability. As the discussion continued, the ability
to stow the strut in a less susceptible configuration was found
to be a better. The relocation of the procedural step that
extends the strut to a location prior to the installation of
the rack on the aircraft should improve the installation
issue.

Inadequate design of Aft Rack telescopic
Strut Assembly

The inner tube of the extended blade support structure
exhibits too much free movement with respect to the outer
tube of the extended blade support structure. Investigate
increasing the overlap length within the interface to
improve the condition.

Inadequate design of the Forward and Aft
folding blade clamp rollers

Although the material was changed to improve the condition,
the new material continues to degrade within very few folds.
Investigate a new design approach to eliminate the
degradation of the blade retention device. Is a roller
required? Would a Delryn pad be adequate without
degrading the trailing edge of the blade.

Inadequate design of the folding blade
(throw over) strap.

Initial discussions were in the direction of lengthening or
changing the configuration somehow to improve the ability of
the crew to get the strap over the blade. As the discussion
continued, most agreed that crew proficiency and possible
local mods would eliminate this issue.

Lengthen or change the configuration somehow to improve
Inadequate design of the fixed blade (throw
the ability of the crew to get the strap over the blade.
over) strap.
Investigate lengthening the strap as a solution.
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TABLE 2: CONTINUED
DEFICIENCY

DISCUSSION

The extended blade strap support had problems feeding its
way over the trailing edge of the extended blade once thrown
Inadequate design of the fixed blade (throw over the top. The width variations provide edges that snag on
over) strap.
the trailing edge. Although the transition has been improved,
there continues to be snag issues with the design. Improving
the transience will eliminate this issue.
Depending on the condition of the speed handle and the
manufacturer, the speed handle retention ring that retains the
Inadequate retention of the Forward and Aft
handle of the speed handle can be too restrictive to allow the
Rack speed handle
handle to be easily removed. Investigate moving the
retaining ring an additional .5 inches upward.
The Blade guard installed on the top clamp of the Forward
and Aft Jacking Pole Assembly has no purpose. Although the
design was driven by information on the rotor system that
Unnecessary component on the Forward and
proved conservative, the actual movement of the blades do
Aft Jacking Poles
not seem to require the guard. Investigate the possibility of
removing the guard and adding protective material to the
blade side of the upper clamp.
When the upper arm (in the extended position) on the heavy
weather rack is placed over the non folding rack the arm
Component on the Forward and Aft Jacking contacts the Blade Guard. The design was forced to have a
Poles interferes with the installation of the telescopic capability on the arm to allow the arm to clear the
heavy weather rack
Blade Guard. Investigate the elimination of the guard and
the removal of the telescoping component on the upper
arm.
The lower clamp arm on the Forward and Aft Jacking Pole
has two positions; Normal and Heavy Weather. During folds
Unnecessary lower clamping position on the at Sea Trials, the Heavy Weather position was used during the
first fold and was never placed back in the Normal position
Forward and Aft Jacking Pole.
throughout Sea Trials. Investigate the removal of the two
position capability on the lower arm.
During the installation of the forward and aft heavy weather
rack, if the blade is positioned incorrectly, the blade can
Inadequate blade protection on the forward contact metal surfaces on the lower arm. Investigate the
and aft heavy weather rack.
application of a larger Delryn pad to adequately protect
the blade during the installation of the heavy weather
rack.
With the issues associated with the installation of the pins, the
use of ladders to install, and the somewhat uncontrolled
placement of the upper clamp over the non-folding blade,
Over-complex design of the heavy weather there is a desire to simplify the design of the rack. During
Sea Trials, H-60 aircraft secured their blades with a clamp
rack.
device that seemed considerably easier to use. Investigate
the possibility of using a clamp style blade interface on the
heavy weather rack.
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TABLE 2: CONTINUED
DEFICIENCY

Inadequate handles on the Blade Handling
Pole (crutch pole).

Excessive weight of the Blade Handling
Pole (crutch pole).

Lack of data associated with the optimum
elevation of the blade for the least force to
fold the blades

Excessive turns required to raise the
Forward and Aft Jacking Poles.

DISCUSSION
Although the conditions during Sea Trials were considered
moderate, there was an instance that the man on the crutch
pole lost his grip on the pole. During degraded weather the
opportunity to loose control of the crutch pole is increased
significantly due to the lack of any high friction surface to
hold the pole. Investigate the application of grip tape or
some other high friction surface on the handling areas of
the pole.
During Sea Trials personnel noted that there was significant
effort applied to getting the crutch pole in place and
managing while it was in place. Investigate a weight
reduction program for the crutch pole, possibly a design
similar to the H-60 clamp.
Although the additional pole attached to the crutch pole
allowed for the movement of the rotor system during fold, the
forces were still in the 80 pound range. During a test at Pax,
there was a test that demonstrated that the pivot pin was
significantly relieved when the blade was extended another
4.5 inches past the maximum elevation of the Jacking Pole
blade clamp. Although this does not categorically indicate
that the binding in the joint is relieved when the blade is lifted
past the maximum reach of the BFR, it is certainly worth
investigating a better elevation for the blade during folding to
reduce the force to fold. Investigate the binding loads of the
pivot joint at various blade elevations.
The Aft Jacking pole requires 82 revolutions to raise the
blade clamp to the maximum elevation. The Forward Jacking
Pole requires a similar amount. The crews that folded during
Sea Trials all commented that the time it took to raise the
Jacking Pole was excessive and that the force to raise could
be considerably more. Investigate the use of a lower gear
ratio on the Jacking Pole raising mechanism.

The mechanism to secure the 3d strut NORCO Pin Assembly
inadequately retains the assembly. The NORCO Pin does not
Inadequate 3d strut NORCO Pin Assembly
freely install into the pin holes and the retaining mechanism
storage.
for the other end of the Assembly allows the end to become
loose.
During operations at Sea Trials it was noted that the
telescoping capability on the Forward Strongback that allows
the crew to attach the 3d strut when the Strongback is at 45
degree orientation was not used. When asked if it was a
Unnecessary telescoping section on the
capability that could be used in some situations, the answer
was that it was not necessary. Investigate the elimination of
Forward Stongback.
the telescopic capability and use the newly available
length of square tubing to stiffen the joint on the required
telescoping section (AH-1Z to/from UH-1Y
configurations) by create a longer overlap .
Rotor Brake Tool is difficult to install in both aircraft. With
the ship motion, the port installation on the UH-1Y is
Inadequate design of the Rotor Brake Tool. particularly dangerous for personnel climbing on the aircraft.
Investigate the actual requirement for the rotor brake and
if it is still required make it easier to install.
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TABLE 2: CONTINUED
DEFICIENCY

DISCUSSION

In the event that a non-folding blade is rotated too far and the
blade contacts the rack, there are no provisions for protecting
Inadequate protection for the non-folding
the trailing edge of the blade. Especially during darkened
blade on the Jacking Pole.
ship, there is a considerable possibility that the blade can
contact the rack. Investigate the addition of a protective
surface to prevent damage to the blade.
During the operation of telescoping the 3d struts it is very
easy to go past the pinning hole, especially during a darkened
ship condition. Although loosening the hole tolerances will
Lack of adequate marking on the telescoping
help, a visual indicator that is readily visible with NVG
components.
compatible lights will make the operation significantly easier.
Investigate the marking of the hole positions with NVG
compatible markings.
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